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ADOPTING A COMPROMISE IN THE
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION BATTLE:
A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, a maelstrom of controversy has surrounded the
practice of transracial adoption (TRA), specifically, the placement of African-
American children with white adoptive parents.' The central question in the
debate is whether agencies should consider the race of the child and the races
of potential adoptive parents when making placement decisions.2 The opponents
of TRA contend that placing an African-American child in a white family is
harmfid to the child and denies the child the opportunity to know his or her
heritage.' Further, they believe that white adoptive parents are unable to teach
an African-American child the requisite social skills, as well as the racial pride
1. Although transracial adoption (IRA) is technically defined as a family from one race
adopting a child from a different race, in practice, it usually describes the adoption of non-white
children by a white family. This note will often focus on the adoption of African-American children
specifically, since white adoption of black children is the only form of TRA that continually causes
controversy. RrrA JAMES SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 9 (1977). See
also Beth Brophy, The Unhappy Politics oflnterracialAdoption, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov.
13, 1989, at 72 (pointing out that not all adoptions between races are as politically controversial as
those involving African-American children; inter-country adoptions from Columbia, India, and the
Philippines are cited as causing little controversy).
2. See generally JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES (1977); SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note
1; RUTH G. MCROY & MYRON L. McRoy, BLACK HOMES FOR BLACK CHILDREN (1974); JAN DE
HARTOG, THE CHILDREN (1969); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The
Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991). See also Michael Precker,
The Battle For Christopher, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1993, at IF. The story of
Christopher Jenkins captures the essence of the TRA debate. Christopher Jenkins was born
premature, addicted to cocaine, and placed in foster care with a white family. The child remained
with the family for more than two years. Over that time, the family became emotionally attached
to Christopher and petitioned to adopt him. Christopher had siblings in another adoptive home, so
Texas caseworkers periodically took Christopher to visit them. The African-American family who
adopted Christopher's siblings also wanted to adopt Christopher. One of the "hand-overs" was
captured on video as Christopher screamed, kicked, and resisted being taken by the caseworker.
The tape was soon shown on news broadcasts across the country and enraged many. Due to the
state policy at that time against TRAs, the family's petition for adoption was rejected by the state
of Texas. Eventually, exposure of the case forced the state to approve the permanent adoption of
Christopher by his white foster family. A new Texas law, the passage of which, in part, was a
result of the controversy caused by Christopher's case, prohibits the use of race as a consideration
in adoption. See Tex. H.B. 196, 73d Leg., RS (1993).
3. James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative
Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interest of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487, 509-11 (1988).
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and identity needed to survive in a racist society." The proponents of TRAs
argue that children need to be placed in permanent, loving homes, regardless of
the color of the parents.5
This issue must be considered within the context of the current situation
surrounding adoption and adoptable children. In 1989, the Child Welfare
League of America found that minority children constituted fifty-one percent of
those children waiting more than two years for adoption.' Many of these
children will wait in foster homes until they are adopted; however, the longer
they wait, the less likely their chance for adoption.' In 1987, there were
275,000 children in the foster care system in the United States." Today, studies
indicate that there are 500,000 children in foster care waiting for adoption.9
Half of the children in the foster care system are minorities. ° Over a third of
the total number are African-American children, which is highly disproportional
to the African-American population in the United States."I
There are very few white adoptable children as compared to the number of
white parents wishing to adopt a white child.' 2 Many white would-be adoptive
parents, frustrated by the long wait to adopt a white child, are willing to adopt
transracially. 3 Criticism and concern about the effects of TRA have made
agencies hesitant to make such placements.' Most agencies follow strict,
though often unwritten, race-matching policies. " Agency policymakers
generally are TRA opponents and believe that TRA is only appropriate as a last
4. Id. at 488, 510-12.
5. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanyingtext. See generaly Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black
Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MIcH. L. REv.
925 (1994) (arguing that the use of racial matching is unjustified because the benefits of TRA are
far greater than any speculative harm that may result from such a placement).
6. Adoption inAmerica: Child Welfare League ofAmerica Study, CHILDREN TODAY, May-June
1989, at 3. The statistics are even more dramatic in some areas. In New York City, as of June
1993, 75 % of the children awaiting adoption were African-American. Charisse Jones, Role of Race
in Adoptions: Old Debate is Being Reformed, N.Y. TIMS, Oct. 24, 1993, at YI.
7. Jones, supra note 6, at Y1.
8. Bowen, supra note 3, at 491.
9. iUse Funderburg, Why Can't Adoption be Multicultural?, NMWSDAY, May 25, 1993, at 75.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1166. See Funderburg, supra note 9, at 75 (indicating that while
90% of the parents waiting to adopt are white, only half of the adoptable children in the United
States are white).
13. Sonia L. Nazario, Ideniy Crisis, When White Parents Adopt Black Babies, Race Often
Divides, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1990, at 1.
14. Clarence Page, Adoption Myths, Mistakes About Blacks, PHOENIX GAzrIs, Nov. 30,
1993, at BI3. See generally supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
15. ELIZABETH BARTHOLEr, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING
95 (1993) [hereinafter FAMILY BONDS].
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resort.' 6 In Massachusetts, for example, if an African-American family is not
found to adopt an African-American baby, the child is, on the average, four
years old before a white adoptive family is even considered.' 7 Many of the
racial matching policies used by agencies are in conflict with the basic law
against racial discrimination in this country by making race not merely a factor,
but the central factor in placement. 18
These opposing positions have caused a bitter debate over the past twenty-
two years.'9 Since the debate began in the early 1970s, the number of TRAs
has drastically reduced.' As the statistics dealing with foster care indicate,2'
the victims of this battle are the minority children who are forced to wait for a
same-race family to adopt them.' Because the best interest of the child is the
paramount concern in adoption,' some balance must be established between
the opposing positions to increase the number of minority-children placements.
A well constructed, specific statute could help balance these opposing
positions. Unfortunately, the statutes that exist today are often ambiguous as to
the weight that agencies should give to race as a factor in considering competing
adoption petitions.' The problem created by this ambiguity is that the
adoption agency workers often lack sufficient guidance on how to weigh race as
a factor in determining the placement of a child.' A more troublesome
16. Id. See also Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1166. These policies of making only same-race
placements often cause would-be adopting parents to be told there are no children available. The
reality in these situations is that there are no same-race children available, and the agency does not
want to make a TRA. Id.
17. Charles A. Radin, Waiting For a Home: Opposition to Transracial Adoption Slows Black
Placements, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1989, at lp. These children will most likely spend the first
four years of their lives in several different foster families. Id.
18. FAMILY BONDS, supra note 15, at 106-07. The author points out that over the past 25
years, the body of law has grown that prohibits the use, by state and private actors, of race as a
classification. This prohibition has reached nearly every other area of life. See Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting segregation by race in public schools); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that states may not prohibit marriage between persons solely because
they are of different races); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that a court cannot
deny custody by a natural parent because that parent has remarried a person of a different race).
19. Brophy, supra note 1, at 72. TRA was not considered controversial until the National
Association of Black Social Workers attacked the practice in 1972, labelling it cultural genocide.
See infra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
20. See Jones, supra note 6; Jeff Meer, Adopting the Melting Pot, PSYCH. TODAY, Apr. 1986,
at 16; see also infra note 63 and accompanying text.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
22. Id. See also FAMILY BONDS, supra note 15, at 99 (stating that the impact of current TRA
policies is the delay and denial of permanent placement for minority children).
23. See nfra note 153-54.
24. See infra notes 128-50 and accompanying text.
25. See &nfra note 173 and accompanying text.
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problem also emerges from this lack of guidance: social workers, due to
personal bias on the issue, may feel free to use race as the sole factor in
placements since the law is so ambiguous and because courts pay great deference
to agency decisions.' Furthermore, it is apparent from the literature on the
issue and from adoption statistics that the agencies are not always staying within
the constitutional boundaries on race considerations established by the courts.'
This Note proposes a statute to effectuate a compromise between the diffuse
positions in the battle over TRA. Section II of this Note outlines the
controversial history of TRA and the positions taken by groups on both sides of
the issue.' Section I analyzes the history of case law from courts
considering the role of race in TRAs, and shows that the courts have merely set
broad parameters for the role of race in these considerations." Section IV
discusses the few state statutes that give guidance on how agencies and courts
should weigh race as a factor in adoption.'
Finally, in Section V, this Note proposes a model state statute that
consolidates and adjusts many meritorious ideas on TRA by proponents and
26. A recent article noted that all states have same-race preference policies, but only a few have
put those policies into law. Same-Race Adoption Law Ignites Deep Emotions, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4,
1993, at NI 1. The fact that same-race preference is an unwritten policy may encourage placement
workers to elevate race to the determining factor, which falls outside of the accepted weight as
established by the courts. See also Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1191 (contending that the unwritten
policies of agencies are far more extreme in promoting racial matching than the written policies
suggest).
This concern becomes more important when one considers that when race becomes the
overriding or sole factor in a placement, it is a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). The Act prohibits programs from receiving federal funds if they
discriminate on the basis of race, nationality, or religion. Lynn Duke, Couples Challenging Same-
Race Adoption Policies, WASH. POST, April 5, 1992, at Al (discussing the use of Title VI in TRA
cases).
27. One commentator has stated that race is "a central organizing principle for the agencies
which have been delegated authority to construct adoptive families.* Bartholet, supra note 2, at
1165. See also SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22 (pointing out the inconsistency between the
laws and policies dealing with TRA and the actual use of race in adoption placements); infra notes
182-83 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 31-68 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 69-127 and accompanying text. Equal protection and due process
challenges, largely by white families, have evoked the majority position that it is unconstitutional
to allow race to be the sole determining factor in the placement of a child with a family. However,
the majority, in a case following the above position, held that the race or ethnic heritage of the child
and the prospective parents can be one of many factors considered in placing children. In re
Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See Angela T. McCormick, Note,
Transracial Adoption: A Critical View of the Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303 (1990)
(arguing that the general rule applied by the courts is ineffective and inconsistent and, as applied,
courts have had difficulty showing that race is or is not actually being used as a decisive factor).
30. See infra notes 128-50.
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opponents of the practice, from state statutes, and from scholarly writings. The
proposed statute's goal is to create a balance between all these sources and thus
will allow those on both sides of the issue to accept the statute as the best
possible compromise. The need for a compromise is clear: as long as the battle
rages, placement of children will be slowed; consequently, the best interests of
the children will not be served.
II. HnsroucAL BACKGROUND OF THE TRA CoNTROvERsY
Throughout history, white families have adopted children of color, though
not in any systematic manner.3 The organized beginning of TRA has been
traced to two groups: Minority Adoption Recruitment of Children's Homes
(MARCH) formed in the United States in 1955, and the Open Door Society
formed in Canada in 1960.2 These and similar groups pushed for a change
of direction from the traditional policy of adoption agencies matching children
with adoptive parents based upon their common race.33 By 1972, the number
of TRAs had increased dramatically because of the activities of these groups and
other proponents of TRA.' The lack of availability of white adoptable
children, the increasing acceptance of TRAs, and the fact that some white
families adopted transracially as a commitment to racial integration, may have
contributed to the increase in TRAs.Y With this rise in TRAs, however, came
a growing opposition against the practice. 6
Opposition to the practice of TRA gained its foundation and strength within
the "black power" movement in the late 1960s.) The main voice for black
31. The National Association of Black Social Workers, Preserving Black Families: Research
and Action Beyond the Rhetoric 31-32 (Feb. 1986) (unpublished report available from the National
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW)) [hereinafter Research and Action].
32. These groups addressed the problem of adoptable African-American children languishing
in institutions or foster care in need of permanent homes. By 1969, 47 organizations similar to
MARCH and the Open Door Society existed in the United States. Id.
33. Agencies maintain that the best interest of the child is served by placing him or her with
a family of similar physical appearance to the child. The reason for the policy is to make the
adoption easier to deal with and allow the child to be considered an important part of the central
family unit. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Race as Factor in Adoption Proceedings, 34 A.L.R. 4th
167, 169 (1984).
34. A survey in 1970 indicated that the number of reported TRAs rose nationally from 587 in
1968 to 1743 in 1970 in agencies reporting. OPPORTUNITY: DIVISION OF BOYS AND GIRLS AID
SocIErY OF OREGON (1970), reprinted in SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32.
35. Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: TransracalAdoption and Cultural Preservation, 59
UMKC L. REV. 487,-488-89 (1991).
36. LADNER, supra note 2, at 72.
37. The "black power" movement developed as many African-Americans became frustrated
with the progress of the civil rights movement and gravitated toward a more militant movement
based upon a desire for autonomy, as opposed to assimilation. Id. at 73.
Platt: Adopting a Compromise in the Transracial Adoption Battle: A Propo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
480 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
autonomy within the sphere of child welfare and adoption was the National
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW), which rejected the practice of
TRA.' The general objections to TRA are not based upon a belief that a
white family cannot meet a child's desire for love or his/her material needs, but
rather upon the concern that white families are unable to equip the child with
certain social survival skills." These survival skills are needed to help the
child understand and cope with racism in society.'
The NABSW reaffirmed its position against TRA in 1978, stating that the
organization's position was based upon two basic principles. First, African-
American children should not be deprived of their racial and cultural identity by
being reared in white homes. 4' Second, African-American families should be
allowed to adopt African-American children free from discrimination.' The
NABSW's position caused adoption agencies to reconsider their use of TRAs.'
Agencies began to weigh the social, political, and cultural effects that a
38. NABSW first stated its opposition to the practice of TRA at its annual meeting in 1972,
which set off a nationwide debate over the continued use of the practice and its social and cultural
ramifications. Id. at 75. The resolution states in relevant part:
Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster care or for
adoption. Black children belong physically, psychologically and culturally in Black
families in order that they receive the total sense of themselves and develop a sound
projection of their future. Human beings are products of their environment and develop
their sense of values, attitudes and self concept within their family structures. Black
children in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of themselves as Black
people.
Id.
39. S. Peter Kim, M.D., Ph.D., Transracial and Transcultural Adoption, AREA H Bulletin 5
(Sept./Oct. 1984) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review). The NABSW believes that
even the most sensitive, loving, and skilled white parent cannot avoid doing irreparable harm to a
black child. Id. See also Brophy, supra note 1, at 72.
40. Kim, supra note 39, at 5.
41. The provision stated in pertinent part:
1. That Black children not lose their cultural identity by being reared in a white home
.... that Black children learn that there are cultural differences between Black and
White and that the Black culture provides a viable positive way of life. This can only
be learned by experiencing Black culture through Black family life and not simply by
reading books, Black history or watching television shows about Black people ....
These survival techniques or coping mechanisms cannot be imparted by White parents
who have not had the experience of growing up Black.
New York Chapter-National Association of Black Social Workers: Tranaracial Adoption Update
1978, at 1-2 [hereinafter NABSW Update] (unpublished report available from the NABSW or the
New York Chapter-ABSW Child Adoption Counseling and Referral Service).
42. The provision states in pertinent part, "Mhat Black families [should] be allowed to adopt
Black children.. .. [Black families] are often discriminated against and/or discouraged when they
try to adopt.' Id. See also Research and Action, supra note 31 (reaffirming the previously stated
position of the NABSW).
43. LADNER, supra note 2, at 75.
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transracial placement might cause.'
The NABSW is still the most vocal opponent to TRAs, mainly because of
its members' close contact with African-American children's welfare
concerns.' The NABSW argues that agencies are not forced to make TRAs
because of a lack of potential African-American adoptive parents. 4' Instead,
it argues that agency application standards often eliminate middle- and lower-
middle-class families, and that those families who do try to adopt through
agencies encounter discrimination and discouragement."7  The NABSW
advocates programs that recruit potential African-American adoptive parents. 4
The NABSW cites its own adoption service as an example of a program
successful in matching adoptable African-American children with African-
American adoptive families.
A research project conducted by the North American Council on Adoptable
Children (NACAC) supports, to an extent, the NABSW's arguments." The
report found that eighty-three percent of the responding agencies identified
organizational and/or institutional barriers that prevented or discouraged
minority families from adopting.'1 Much of the criticism pointed to agency
practices that dissuaded minorities from adopting. Minority communities
have a historical tendency toward "informal" adoption which may also account
44. Id.
45. Id. at 76.
46. NABSW Update, supra note 41, at 6.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The New York Chapter of the American Black Social Workers Child Adoption Counseling
and Referral Service was started in 1975 to recruit, evaluate, and refer prospective African-American
adoptive families, educate the African-American community about adoption, and to work to change
child care agency policies and state laws that make it difficult for African-Americans to adopt. Id.
The Service also sponsors a training course for social workers, supervisors, and directors of child
care agencies to enable these workers to become more culturally sensitive in working with African-
American families and children. Adoption Program Fights Bariers, ABSW-N.Y. CITY CHAPTrM
NEws, Summer/Fall 1993, at 1.
50. See generally TOM GIllES & JOE KROLL, BARRIERS TO SAME RACE PLACEMENT:
RESEARCH BRIEF #2 (1991) (available from the North American Council on Adoptable Children).
The report surveyed 64 private and 23 public child placing agencies located in 25 states, focusing
on placement of minority children legally freed for adoption. The goal was to shed light on
placement practices, policies, and procedures that most directly affect minority adoption. Id. at 7.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 7-8. Some of the practices cited are: institutional and systemic racism, high adoption
fees, inflexible standards of agencies for potential adoptive parents, lack of minority staff, lack of
minorities in managerial positions within agencies, and general lack of recruitment activity and poor
recruitment techniques.
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for minorities' negative perceptions of agencies and their practices.53 There
is also a lack of knowledge in minority communities about the need for adoptive
parents for minority children.' Finally, the study's statistics indicate that
education about adoption and recruitment of minority adoptive parents can
greatly increase the number of same-race adoptions.
55
Several groups that support the practice of TRA have developed to counter
the position of the NABSW.' These groups argue that there is no evidence
that TRA is detrimental to the child. An example of such a group is the
National Coalition to End Racism in America's Child Care System.m The
Coalition is made up of nearly 1000 members including adoptive parents and
government agencies." The Coalition's Statement of Purpose takes the
position that children should be placed in the earliest available home most
qualified to meet the individual child's needs, regardless of the race of the
adoptive family.' Although there are well organized groups such as the
53. "Informal" adoption occurs when a family member or friend takes parental responsibility
for the child of another without a formal adoption. This practice is extensive in minority
communities and some members of those communities are therefore "put off" by the formal process
of legal adoption. Id. at 7, 14.
54. Id. at 8.
55. Whereas traditional agencies placed children in same-race homes at a 47% rate, minority
placement specialists did so at a rate of 91%. These minority placement specialists are successfil,
in part, because they consider and encourage the following in their programs: recruitment,
retention, informative homestudy process, reduced fees (the average minority placement specialist
charged $1439 for an adoption versus an average of $5780 in a traditional agency), and state
involvement in funding and support of such a placement program. Id. at 8-9.
56. See generally Maureen McCauley Evans, Transracial Adoption: Questions and Challenges
for Children & Parents Alike, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1993, at b5 (listing several of the groups that
offer support and resources to transracial adoptive families, such as the Interracial Family Circle and
Adoptive Families of America).
57. For a good summary of the research in this area, see Mahoney, supra note 35, at 491-93.
58. Hereinafter called the "Coalition."
59. Barbara Bisantz Raymond & Judy Turner, The Color of Love, REDBOOK, Aug. 1992, at
144.
60. The Statement in part states:
To assure that all children needing out of home placement . . . (are] placed in the
earliest available home most qualified to meet the individual child's needs. There
should be no delay to recruit at this time and in foster care the child should not be
moved at a later date to match color or culture. There should be continuing recruitment
of foster and adoptive homes of all races and cultures, and race and culture should be
one of the factors to be considered in placements.
The [Coalition] will work to this end by coordinating efforts of individuals and
groups, so that we may work together throughout the country, educating the public as
well as our political and legal systems. We will use the media and other legal
procedures available to assure that no child is denied services on the basis of race.
National Coalition to End Racism in America's Child Care System, Statement of Purpose
(unpublished statement, available from the Coalition). See also Raymond & Turner, supra note 59
(discussing the Coalition's assistance in bringing a discrimination suit on behalf of white foster
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Coalition that support the practice of TRA, the pressure and the arguments of
the NABSW have been effective." The number of TRAs has fallen since the
NABSW's rejection of TRAs in 1972.' One article stated that by 1986, TRAs
made up fewer than one percent of all adoptions, a dramatic change from the
late 1960s and early 1970s.'
The NABSW's and the Coalition's arguments are fairly representative of
the arguments taken by other groups that take a position on the issue of TRA.
Such positions are interesting to contrast because they are identified as opposing
views of the issue of TRA; however, a closer look seems to indicate some
common ground. This common ground can act as a starting point for a
compromise to help rectify the TRA debate.
Both sides stress the need for the development of recruitment of potential
minority adoptive families so children do not have to wait in foster care for
same-race placements." Both sides also encourage educating the public and
the political policymakers about adoption and the issues that surround TRA.'
Although they disagree as to the weight, both sides agree that any placement
equation must consider race and culture.' Further, both would agree that if
a child is adopted transracially, the adopting family must expose the child to his
or her race, ethnic heritage, and culture. 7  Finally, and most importantly,
parents who wished to adopt their African-American foster child).
61. LADNER, supra note 2, at 75.
62. See SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 1; see supra note 34. The NABSW's provocative
statements, such as comparing TRA to cultural genocide, caused concern in many agencies that they
may cause harm to African-American children placed in white homes. This concern and the fear
of a public backlash against TRAs caused agencies to begin following an unwritten rule of making
only same-race placements. Jones, supra note 6, at YI.
63. Meer, supra note 20, at 17. This adoption rate is dramatically low considering the high
percentage of minority children who are awaiting adoption. Jones, supra note 6, at YI. In 1975,
the United States government stopped collecting national adoption statistics, with the dissolution of
the National Center for Social Statistics. Since that time there have been a few surveys done by
other organizations that have attempted to record adoption statistical data, but these efforts have been
limited. NATIONAL COMMIrrrE FOR ADOPTION, 1989 ADOPTION FACTBOOK 56 (1989) [hereinafter
FACTBOOK]. Therefore, although it is generally agreed that the number of TRAs has dramatically
decreased, actual data for all adoptions nationally are not available and any number given is simply
a deductive estimate.
64. C. supra note 60 (discussing the Coalition's Statement of Purpose that encourages the
continuing use of recruitment). See also supra notes 52, 55 and accompanying text (showing that
recruitment is a necessary procedure to increase same-race adoptions).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. This idea was best put by one author, stating in pertinent part:
White parents who adopt black youngsters must also be willing and able to identify not
only with their black children but also with blacks generally .... To adopt a black
child means that these parents have forfeited their rights to be regarded as a "white"
family. They cannot try to continue to fit the role of the idealized white middle-class
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although the groups on both sides of the issue disagree about the role that race
should play in placement, both are obviously committed to achieve what they
believe is in the best interest of the child. This common ground between the
two sides is the best starting point for any statute that attempts to pull together
the concerns and agendas on both sides of the issue.'t
II. CASE LAW CONSIDERING RACE AS A FACTOR
IN ADOPTION PLACEMENT
The case law on TRA is limited.' It must first be noted that a complete
ban on TRAs would be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and facially invalid.7° The last state statute that prohibited
TRAs was struck down in 1972, in Compos v. McKeithen.7' The United States
Supreme Court has avoided specifically deciding any TRA cases to date.'
However, in Pabmore v. Sidoti, 3 the Court did consider the use of race in the
nuclear family who happen to have a black adopted child.
LADNER, supra note 2, at 254. See also Leor Neal & Al Stumph, Transracial Parenting: If It
Happens, How White Parents and the Black Community Can Work Together, ADOPrALx, Winter
1993, at 6. The two authors of this article included the Executive Director of the Association of
Black Social Workers Child Adoption, Counseling, and Referral Service, and the Director of Foster
Care and Adoption Training Programs at the Center for Development of Human Services, who is
also a white adoptive father of mixed race children. Id.
68. These common concerns will be further developed later in infra section V, within the
proposed statute. See also infra notes 151-202 and accompanying text.
69. For a review of the few cases that deal with race considerations in adoption placements, see
Zitter, supra note 33.
70. In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 659 ('ex. Civ. App. 1967). The appellate court reversed
a Texas trial court which refused to allow the Petitioner, an African-American man, to adopt his
wife's two minor Caucasian daughters. Id. The trial court acknowledged that the Petitioner and his
wife's home met all the requirements under the Texas adoption statute; however, adoption of a white
child by an African-American adult was prohibited by Texas law. Id. The appellate court struck
down the law as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally D. Michael Reilly, District of Columbia Survey:
Constitaional Law: Race as a Factor in InterracialAdoptions, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022 (1983).
71. 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972). The Louisiana statute (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422)
provided in pertinent part: "A single person over the age of twenty-one years, or a married couple
jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race.' Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 264.
72. Timothy P. Glynn, Note, The Role of Race in Adoption Proceedings: A Constitutional
Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MINN. L. REv. 925, 932 (1993).
73. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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similar question of child-custody.7 4 The Court held that a state cannot use race
as a factor in a decision to remove a child from the custody of a parent found
to be an appropriate person to have such custody.'5 The courts have limited
this rule to custody cases and have not extended it into the areas of adoption or
foster care.' The distinction between custody and adoption does not, on its
face, appear vast. However, taking a child away from his or her biological
parent because of race7 is vastly different from trying to place a child in a new
same-race adoptive home.'
The courts have held that it is unconstitutional to allow race to act as the
74. In this case, a Caucasian father was seeking to obtain custody of his daughter after the
daughter's biological mother, who was also Caucasian, had married an African-American. The trial
court had granted custody to the father because of the concern that the child may suffer some social
stigma by living with her mother and her mother's new African-American husband. The Supreme
Court agreed that some prejudice and stigma may be encountered, but concluded that this was not
enough to justify the use of race as the sole determining factor in custody cases. Id. at 430-433.
But c f Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950) (awarding custody of an African-
American father's daughters to him because they looked like him rather than their Caucasian
mother). The court stated,
We do not question the mother's love for her children. But we have always stated...
that our primary concern is the welfare of the children. . . . These unfortunate girls,
through no fault of their own, are the victims of a mixed marriage and a broken home.
They will have a much better opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they
are brought up among their own people.
Id. at 756. The court in Tucker v. Tucker, 542 P.2d 789, 791 (Wash. App. 1975), stated that Ward
would probably be overruled if it came before the court today.
75. 466 U.S. at 434.
76. Glynn, supra note 72 (citing J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1989), cer.
denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990)). See also In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 120 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982) (following Palmore forcefully, stating that the lower court was "fundamentally mistaken"
to hold that race is or should be a factor, concern, or consideration in a child custody case).
77. Usually, the race of the biological parent's new spouse is different from the child and is the
reason the other biological parent is preferred. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); see
also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
78. The former situation is a denial of parental rights based upon race, regardless of the
parent's abilities to parent. The latter situation is merely an attempt to place the child in an
environment conducive to proper emotional, racial, and cultural development of the child, and also
to assure that the state's compelling interest, the best interest of the child, is served. The right to
parent and raise children has long been a highly protected practice. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 769 (1977) ("No one disputes the appropriateness of [a state's] concern with the family
unit, perhaps the most fundamental social institution of our society."); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 256 (1983):
The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are
woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and
flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional
protection in appropriate cases.
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sole determining factor in the placement of a child with a family. 9  The
majority in the first major case to so hold also held that the race or ethnic
heritage of the child and the prospective parents may act as one of many factors
considered in placing children.su The court held that the prohibition against
parents adopting across racial lines would often serve a harsh and unjust end."'
In re Adoption of a Minor$2 first established that race could act as a
relevant factor in an adoption placement. However, the court in Minor did not
specify the circumstances that would justify such consideration. This ambiguity
was resolved in In re Moorehead.'3 In Moorehead, a white couple appealed
from the state trial court's denial of their motion for permanent custody of their
foster child, an African-American girl, of whom they had custody since she was
nine days old."' When the child was ten months old, the couple notified the
County's Child Services Board (CSB) that they desired to adopt the child.'
The CSB denied the couple's adoption.' Although the CSB stated that there
were other reasons for its denial, there was no evidence to substantiate that the
denial was based upon anything other than the CSB's desire to place the child
with an African-American family. 8 A hearing was held before a referee, who
denied the couple's motion for permanent custody and recommended that the
child stay in the permanent custody of the CSB and that the CSB should
determine which family was best suited to adopt the child.88 The trial court
79. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955). In this case, the
biological mother, who was white, had a child born out of wedlock. The natural father's
whereabouts were unknown. The mother subsequently married an African-American and consented
to his adoption of the child. Since the Plaintiff's application was quite adequate to allow adoption,
the District Court stated that "[o]rdinarily such an adoption should be not only approved but
encouraged"; however, it denied the adoption, largely because the adoptive father was African-
American, while the mother and child were white. Id. at 447. The D.C. Circuit reversed, stating
that the controlling consideration was to ensure the "best interests of the infant" and:
There may be reasons why a difference in race, or religion, may have relevance in
adoption proceedings. But that factor alone cannot be decisive in determining the child's
welfare. It does not permit a court to ignore all other relevant considerations. Here we
think those other considerations have controlling weight.
Id. at 447-48. See also Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Serv., 563 F.2d
1200, 1206 (1977) (discussed infra notes 93, 95-99 and accompanying text); In re DeF, 307 A.2d
737 (D.C. 1973).
80. Minor, 228 F.2d at 448.
81. Id. See also In re Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (1ex. Civ. App. 1967).
82. 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
83. 600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
84. Id. at 779-80.
85. Id. at 780.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
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subsequently rejected the couple's objections to the referee's determinations."
The Court of Appeals in Moorehead held that the trial judge improperly
adopted the referee's determination without considering the evidence and
wrongly deferred to the agency that chose an adoptive home for the child
involved solely on the basis of race.' This case reaffirmed that the use of race
as the sole or dominant factor at any level of the adoption process violates the
Equal Protection Clause.9' The court held that when it appears an agency used
race as the sole or dominant factor, the court must pay no deference to the
agency's finding and shall make its own determination in the child's best
interest.
92
The constitutionality of the use of race as a factor in an adoption usually
follows the tests established in two cases, Drummond v. Fulton County
Department of Family & Children's Services and In re R.M.G." In
Drummond, the court considered whether a state agency, charged with placing
a child in its custody for adoption, may consider the race of the child and
prospective adoptive parents without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution." The court upheld the trial court's determination
that the consideration of race was properly directed to the best interest of the
child and was not used as a factor that automatically disqualified the plaintiffs'
petition." The court concluded that because of the difficult nature of TRAs,
race can act as a decisive factor which tips the balance between two otherwise
equal potential adoptive families, absent proof of discriminatory intent.' The
Fifth Circuit applied the United States Supreme Court's plurality rule from
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,' that when race
89. Id.
90. Id. at 788.
91. Glynn, supra note 72, at 935. See also Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 267
(E.D. La. 1972); Fountainev. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 534-35 (11. App. Ct. 1956) ('In passing
upon the question of how the interests and welfare of the children will be best served, the court can
and should take into consideration all relevant considerations which might properly bear upon the
problem. However, we do not believe that the question of race alone can overweigh all other
considerations and be decisive of the question."); In re Adoption of Baker, 185 N.E.2d 51, 52-53
(Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
92. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d at 788. The court stated that the reviewing court should only
uphold the placement if the determination passes strict scrutiny. Id.
93. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
94. 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
95. Drwmond, 563 F.2d at 1205. The action was brought by a white couple who acted as
state-designated foster parents of a mixed-race child for over two years and whose application for
permanent custody was denied by the defendant. Id. at 1203.
96. Id. at 1204-05.
97. Id. at 1205.
98. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (holding that when dealing with voting apportionment, consideration
of race is not impermissible).
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is considered in a nondiscriminatory fashion and no racial slur or stigma with
respect to any race is created, there is no discrimination violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
A more demanding analysis is used in In re R.M.G.I" In this case, a
child was born to an African-American mother, and the child's African-
American father was unaware of the birth.""' The mother, without the
knowledge of the father, placed the child up for adoption,'02 and the
Department of Human Services later placed the child with white foster
parents. ' 3  The foster parents subsequently filed a petition for adoption."°
However, the natural father objected to the adoption when notified by the
Department of Human Services,'t 5 and the child's paternal grandmother and
her husband then filed to adopt the child. '06
Although the trial court found that the families were otherwise equal, it
granted the biological grandmother and her husband's petition for adoption based
upon the possibility that the child may question her racial and cultural identity
as she grows older. 11 On appeal, the court stated that neither the statute
involved"U nor the cases interpreting it provided guidance as to whether
agencies may consider race in such a placement and still remain within the
constitutional boundaries.'09 Therefore, the issue presented was whether the
Constitution prohibits the use of race as a relevant factor in an adoption, and if
so, what level of scrutiny the court must apply. 0 The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court endorsed an intermediate scrutiny for benign racial
classification, but was not convinced that the use of race in adoption was a
benign use.'"
The R.M.G. court instructed that since the controlling statute on its face
takes race into account, it is constitutionally suspect and must receive strict
99. Id. at 165.
100. 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
101. Id. at 780.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 780 (D.C. 1982).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 782.
108. 1973 D.C. STAT. 16-305 required information about the race of the petitioner and the
prospective adoptees. The provision did not indicate the proper or intended use of this information.
109. 454 A.2d at 784.
110. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 784 (D.C. 1982).
111. Id. at 785-86.
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scrutiny." 2 Strict scrutiny, the court noted, allows that the racial classification
can only be constitutional if shown to advance a compelling or overriding
governmental interest. Further, the use of race must be necessary to accomplish
the governmental interest." 3 The court held that the advancement of a child's
best interest is a compelling governmental interest, thereby satisfying the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test." 4 The court also held that as to the second
prong of the strict scrutiny test, the consideration of race was necessary to
achieve the governmental interest of assuring the child's best interest."'
Therefore, the use of race in this case survived the strict scrutiny analysis.
However, the court recognized that agencies might, in the actual application of
the statute, consider race in a discriminatory way, and therefore, the court must
analyze the agencies' use in each case.""
The court in R.M. G. listed three analytical steps that the trial court should
address: (1) how the race of each family will affect the child's development of
a sense of self and racial identity; (2) how the competing families compare in
that regard; and (3) how significant the racial differences between the families
are when considering all relevant factors together." 7  The court held that
although the trial court properly considered the race factor as far as the first step
concerning the child's sense of identity, the trial court did not articulate the
112. Id. at 784-85 (citing Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91
(1978)). The strict scrutiny test is used to determine if there has been a denial of equal protection.
The government is required to show that it has a compelling interest to justify the measure, and that
the measure is necessary to secure the governmental interest. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)*
113. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 785 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972));
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). The
court refused to employ the intermediate scrutiny that is used when the racial classification is
'benign," as in affirmative action cases. The court did not believe'that such a standard was
applicable in a family law context. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 786.
114. Id. at 786.
115. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 787-88 (D.C. 1982). The court listed three components of
a child's identity: (1) a sense of belonging in a stable family and community; (2) a feeling of self-
esteem and confidence; and (3) survival skills that allow the child to cope with the world outside the
family. The court concluded that this sense of identity will be developed through the child's
interrelationship with both his or her parents and society. Therefore, the parents' attitude about race
will significantly affect the development of that child's sense t.f identity and is a "necessary"
consideration. Id. at 787. See also In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
The Moorehead court recognized the need to place a child with a family to which the child can feel
he or she naturally belongs. The duplication of the child's natural biological family is an important
method to accomplish this goal. Therefore, consideration of race or ethnicity is necessary to
accomplish this goal. Id.
116. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 790. "Thus, where race is a factor for the trial court to
consider, appellate review of judicial discretion under the statute must be as exacting as our scrutiny
of the statute itself." Id.
117. Id. at 791.
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comparative analysis that is required by steps two and three.""
The trial court found the parties equal after weighing all other factors, and
thus, the race factor was determinative." 9 Therefore, the appellate court was
compelled to reverse and remand because the trial court did not provide a
detailed explanation of its reasoning to assure the reviewing court that the
evaluation of race was precisely tailored to the best interest of the childm2°
The court stated that for effective review when race is a critical factor, the
reviewing court needs to understand exactly how the trial court made the
judgment as to race.' 2' If the trial court's rationale is unclear, the risk of
misuse of race is too high." Accordingly, such an unclear decision will not
survive strict scrutiny.n
The foregoing cases demonstrate that agencies may use race in making
adoption placement decisions. Agencies may weigh race as one factor among
others"u and can tip the balance between two families when all other
considerations are equal."z  As for the constitutionality of the use of race as
a factor, either the court will find that when race is used in a nondiscriminatory
fashion, and no racial group is stigmatized, there is no discrimination violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment as in Drummond; 6 or the court will require the
use of race to pass the strict scrutiny analysis as applied in R.M.G. 127
IV. EXISTING STATE STATUTES DEALING WITH RACE IN ADOPTION
At one end of the statutory spectrum, several states have enacted statutes
which mandate placements with a same-race family if possible."2  The
118. Id. at 793.
119. Id. at 779-80.
120. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 785, 788 (D.C. 1982).
121. Id. at 794. This articulation is necessary to determine whether the decision was a
"precisely analyzed determination, based on carefully thought through comparisons of the parties
drawn from record evidence, or as a more generalized conclusion that race always favors petitioners
of the same race... a judgment reflecting an impermissible intellectual shortcut." Id.
122. Id. at 794.
123. Id.
124. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205
(5th Cir. 1977); In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. 1955).
125. Dnumond, 563 F.2d at 1205.
126. Id.
127. 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982).
128. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1992);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 114-4980(H)(2) (Law. Co-op.
1976). See also Elizabeth Coady, Wanted: Parents For Black Children Conference Held to Seek
Solutions, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 21, 1992, at A-3 (indicating that many of these states have
unwritten same-race policies).
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National Council for Adoption in Washington, D.C., reports that at least thirteen
states require same-race adoptions.' Minnesota's statute, entitled the
"Minnesota Heritage Preservation Act," is representative of the order of
preference that is established in this type of statute. 1"' The usual order of
placement is: (1) with a relative(s) of the child; (2) with a same-race family;
and finally, (3) with a family from a different race than the child.'
California has a similar mandate for a same-race preference. 3 1 California,
however, includes a prohibition against TRA for a period of ninety days after
the child is first relinquished for adoption. This time is to allow recruitment
of a family member or a same-race family. California also prohibits a TRA
before the ninety-day period unless there is a showing that a diligent search for
a relative of the child or a same-race family has been made.'34
129. Coady, supra note 128.
130. The 'Minnesota Heritage Preservation Act" provides in relevant part:
The policy of the state.. . is to ensure that the best interests of the child are met by
requiring due consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage in adoption placements
.... The authorized child placing agency shall give preference... in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, to (a) a relative or relatives of the child, or, if that would
be detrimental to the child, or a relative is not available, to (b) a family with the same
racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or, if that is not feasible, (c) a family of different
racial or ethnic heritage from the child which is knowledgeable and appreciative of the
child's racial or ethnic heritage.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.225 (West 1994). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1992)
(incorporating nearly the exact language as the Minnesota statute). The Minnesota statute was
originally found unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment because its stated
purpose was to ensure preferences and protection of heritage only for minorities. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 259.28 (West 1991). The Minnesota Court of Appeals held this classification failed because "[t]he
heritage of minority children can be protected without the classification by making the preferences
... [established in the Act] ... applicable to a// children, as the legislature has directed in related
statutes." In re Matter of D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The legislature
remedied this problem by removing specific references to minorities from the statute.
131. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28 (West 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie
1992).
132. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West Supp. 1994).
133. Id. The Code states in pertinent part:
Where a child is being considered for adoption, the following order of placement
preferences regarding racial background and ethnic identification shall be used . . . in
determining the placement of the child:
(a) In the home of a relative.
(b) . . . . with an adoptive family with the same racial background or ethnic
identification as the child ....
(c) If placement cannot be made under the rules set forth in this section within 90
days from the time the child is relinquished for adoption or has been declared free
from parental custody or control, the child is free for adoption with a family of
a different racial background or ethnic identification where there is evidence of
sensitivity to the child's race, ethnicity, and culture ....
134. Id.
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Other states use written or unwritten policies that provide essentially the
same preference as established in the statutes of Minnesota, Arkansas, and
California.'" Various other state statutes require that petitioning adoptive
parents list their race or ethnic background and/or the race and ethnic
background of the child on the adoption application. However, these statutes do
not enunciate how agencies and courts must consider and weigh this
information."6
Some state statutes address the situation in which a foster family decides to
petition to adopt a foster child in their care. 37 California simply places the
foster family in the same position as other petitioning families." This offers
no assistance to a foster family whose foster child is from a different race,
because California, for instance, which has such a policy, also has a same-race
preference statute.'" Florida deals with this contingency by removing its
135. FAMILY BONDs, supra note 15, at 95. Though same-race preference is the law in these
three states, it is arguably the policy in forty-five other states. Desda Moss, Race is Qften Adoption
Issue, USA TODAY, June 29, 1994, at 4A.
136. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-105 (1987); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-208 (West 1990);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.12 (West 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (1983); S.D CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.2 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.060 (West 1989). Indiana also
requires an adoption petition to include the color of the child to be adopted. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
3-1-2 (Bums 1987).
Indiana Senate Bill No. 000011 (1993), recently introduced by State Senator Antich, attempted
to remove the inclusion of the child's color from adoption petitions. The bill failed to receive a
hearing. See genera!/y D. Michael Reilly, Note, District of Colwnbia Survey: Constiutional Law:
Race as a Factor in InzerracialAdoptions, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 1022, 1023 (1984) (discussing state
statutes that require a statement indicating the race of the child, natural parents, and/or the
petitioners).
137. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 383 (McKinney 1992) states in relevant part:
Any adult . . . person[a], who, as foster parent or parents, have cared for a child
continuously for a period of twelve months or more, may apply.., for the placement
of said child with them for the purpose of adoption, . . . the agency shall give
preference and first consideration to their application over all other applications for
adoption placements.
Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8704(c) (West 1994) states in relevant part:
[lhf the child has been in foster care for a period of more than four months, the child
has substantial emotional ties to the foster parent[s], . . . the child's removal from the
foster parent[s] ... would be seriously detrimental to the child's well-being, and the
foster parent[s] . . . make a written request to be considered to adopt the child, the
foster parent[s] ... shall be considered with respect to the child along with all other
prospective adoptive parents. The department or licensed adoption agency shall take
into consideration any relevant factors that it deems necessary in determining which
adoptive placement is in the child's best interest.
Id.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 133.
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placement preference criteria in this situation as it applies to the foster
family."4 This creates a predilection for the foster family and indicates that
a preference exists for established stability and bonding instead of race. m41
At the other end of the spectrum, Kentucky and Connecticut have statutes
that completely prohibit the use of race as a factor in considering a petition for
adoption of a child. 1" Texas recently passed a similar law. 1" The law
prohibits the court, when determining the best interest of the child, from denying
or delaying the adoption, or otherwise discriminating on the basis of race or
ethnicity of either the child or the prospective adoptive parents."
The inconsistency and ambiguity in the state statutes and the case law, as
well as concern that race is used as the determinative factor in many adoptions,
led Senator Metzenbaum m0 and Senator Moseley-Braun"4 to propose the
Multiethnic Placement Act of 1993."47 The bill would prohibit agencies that
receive federal funds from delaying or denying placement of a child based on
the race, color, or ethnic heritage of either the child or the adoptive parents or
140. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r 10M-8.0051 (1991). The Code states:
(7)(a) Foster Parents. When a child has established significant emotional bonds to foster
parents who are of a different racial or ethnic background than the child, the order of
placement criteria need not be applied to his case if the foster parents are interested in
adopting him. Categorical denial of adoption of a child by his foster parent based solely
on race is prohibited.
Id.
141. Id.
142. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (Baldwin 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-7 2 6
& 45(a)-727 (West 1981). Kentucky's statute prohibits denial of an adoption based upon "religious,
ethnic, racial, or interfaith background of the adoptive applicant," while the Connecticut law
prohibits rejections of adoption applications solely 'because of a difference in race, color or
religion" between the child and the prospective adoptive parents. See also Reilly, supra note 70,
at 1023-24 (discussing statutes that prohibit the use of race in adoption placements).
143. Tex. H.B. 196, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
144. Id. See also Precker, supra note 2 (discussing one of the cases that provoked the passage
of the Texas law). For a specific discussion about the events that led to the change in the Texas
TRA law, see Jo Beth Eubanks, Comment, TranasracialAdoption in Texas: Should the Best Inerests
Standard Be Color-Blind?, 24 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1225 (1993).
145. Senator Metzenbaum is a Democrat and the senior U.S. Senator from the state of Ohio.
146. Senator Moseley-Braun is a Democrat and a first term U.S. Senator from Illinois.
147. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was passed by the Senate in March of
1994, while a similar bill was introduced in the House. Desda Moss, Race is Qten Adoption Issue,
USA TODAY, June 29, 1994, at 4A. Senator Metzenbaum finally won approval of this bill by
adding it as an amendment to the enormous Elementary and Secondary Education Act, that was
passed in October 1994. President Clinton signed the act into law on October 20, 1994, in Boston.
John A. Farrell, The Paths of Politics Clinton, In Mass. Today, Hopes Successes Abroad Can Stem
Slide, BOsT. GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1994, at 1. See generally Tom Diemer, Memzenbawn Wins on
Adoption Bill; Benefits Minority OCidren, PlAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), Oct. 6, 1994, at 19A.
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foster parents. "s  The bill does little more than restate the parameters
established in the case law on the issue. However, it does indicate that there is
a concern with the application of the laws and the way placement decisions are
actually made. The bill adds a safeguard to insure proper application of the
proposed law, providing for equitable relief to anyone aggrieved by an agency
in violation of the bill's provisions. 49
A survey of state statutes and regulations indicates that no consensus exists
among the states as to the role that race should play in adoption placements.
The statutes generally fail to enunciate the weight that agencies may
constitutionally give race."5 Obviously, a statute cannot ensure proper use of
race as a factor. However, more specificity about the role that race may play
would help encourage proper application. Further, most of the states' statutes
do not deal with many of the peripheral problems that arise in these cases, such
as the rights of foster parents when applying for adoption of their foster child,
the need for actual recruitment, and the level of review that the courts should
use in reviewing the use of race in the adoption considerations.
V. PROPOSAL
The goal of this Note is to provide states with a specific model statute that
effectively deals with the issues that surround TRA. The statute establishes a
preference for same-race placement, but values immediate placement when a
same-race placement is not available. The statute emphasizes: recruitment of
minority families; the education of agencies, courts, and the public about the
role of race in adoption placements; and the value of permanency and bonding
by requiring immediate placements and protecting transracially adopting foster
families. Finally, the statute attempts to assure constitutional use of race in
placement decisions by: specifically enunciating the role race may play;
providing potential adoptive parents with a cause of action when race is used in
contravention of the statute; and requiring that a reviewing court strictly
scrutinize the agency's consideration of race in a challenged adoption where race
may have been used as the sole deciding factor or was given improper weight.
148. Moss, supra note 147, at 4A. It must be noted that this provision does not prohibit the
use of race as a factor, it simply prohibits the use of race as the sole or dominant factor.
149. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at sec. 3(c). Although passage of the amendment indicates
the need for non-discriminatory placements on the part of agencies, it fails to detail the way in which
this shall be accomplished. This development only furthers the need for comprehensive, specific
guidance from state statutes.
150. This vagueness furthers the possibility of misapplication of the statutes in an
unconstitutional manner. Chief Justice Taft once stated that "a statute which requires the doing of
an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaning, violates due process of law."
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926).
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A. Model Transracial Adoption Statute
1.1 Definitions
As used in this statute-
(a) The term "adoption" shall refer to the judicial act of creating the
relationship of parent and child where it did not exist previously.
(b) The term "agency" shall refer to any adoption agency or facility which
is properly licensed and authorized by the State to effectuate adoption
placements.
(c) The term "culture" shall refer to the totality of behavior patterns, arts,
beliefs, institutions, and thoughts characteristically transmitted by and
through a distinct community.
(d) The term "Department" shall refer to the state department that is
authorized to oversee the licensing and operation of adoption agencies
in the state.
(e) The term "ethnic heritage" shall refer to a group sharing similar race
or nationality, who share similar values, customs, language, and traits.
(f) The term "petition" shall refer to the formal written application by the
person(s) requesting to adopt a child.
(g) The term "preference group" shall refer to the group of prospective
adoptive parents who are preferred for placement of a child as
established in section 1.2 of this statute.
(h) The term "racial background" shall refer to closeness of kinship based
strictly on biological ties; a group of people who share similar physical
and biological traits, such as skin color and other similar traits, which
make the group identifiable.
1.2 Appropriate Consideration of Race
(a) The policy of this State is to ensure that the best interest of the child
is met by requiring due consideration, in accordance with this statute,
of the child's racial background or ethnic heritage in adoption
placements.
(b) The agency shall consider the racial background and ethnic heritage of
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a child in arriving at an adoptive placement decision; however, the
agency shall weigh racial background and ethnic heritage equally with
all other appropriate factors that are used in such placement decisions.
(c) The racial background or ethnic heritage factor may act as the
deciding factor between competing adoption petitions if all other
factors indicate that the competing petitions are equal. In such
placement decisions, the agency shall make placements in accordance
with the placement preferences established herein.
(d) The agency, and the court in reviewing such placement, shall give
preference, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, and upon
reviewing all petitions for adoption of the child, to placing the child:
(1) with a relative or relatives of the child; if a relative or relatives
of the child are not available, or if such placement is not in the
best interest of the child,
(2) with a family of the same racial background or ethnic heritage as
the child. If the child has a mixed racial background or ethnic
heritage, the agency shall place the child with a family of the
racial or ethnic group with which the child has more significant
contacts.
(3) If a family meeting the criteria as established in Subsection (1) or
(2) of this Section is not available to adopt, or if such placement
is not in the best interest of the child, the agency shall place the
child with a family of a different racial background or ethnic
heritage than the child. Such a family shall be qualified to adopt
in this situation only if there is reasonable evidence of sensitivity
to the child's race, ethnicity, and culture, as well as reasonable
evidence of a good faith intent on the part of the prospective
parents to assist and encourage the furtherance of the child's
contact with his or her race, ethnicity, and culture, in accordance
with Section 1.3 of this statute.
1.3 Requirement of Racial and Ethnic Sensitivity for Transracial Adoption
(a) Any person or persons who wish to adopt a child of a different racial
background or ethnic heritage shall complete a Cultural Sensitivity
Training Course.
(b) The Department, or any agency, shall administer the Cultural
Sensitivity Training Courses. The courses shall also be made available
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as a self-taught, home study if the prospective family demonstrates a
good faith reason for being unable to attend the taught sessions.
(c) The agency shall use the participation in the course sessions as part of
the evaluation to determine whether there is reasonable evidence of the
prospective adoptive parents' sensitivity to the child's race, ethnicity,
and culture, as well as evidence of a good faith intent on the part of
the prospective parents to assist and encourage the furtherance of the
child's contact with his or her race, ethnicity, and culture.
(d) The Department or agency may terminate any placement for adoption
with a family of different racial background or ethnic heritage before
the granting of an order for adoption upon a finding that the family is
not attending, or making a good faith effort to attend, the sessions, or
is failing to utilize the self-taught material, of the Cultural Sensitivity
Training Course.
(1) The Department or agency may remove the child from the
custody of the prospective adoptive parents and place the child in
another adoptive home, in accordance with the preference of
placement in Section 1.2, or other appropriate temporary care.
(2) Such removal shall occur only with the approval of the court,
upon motion by the Department or agency after notice to the
prospective parents, supported by an affidavit stating the grounds
on which removal is sought. The court, in its discretion, may
reject the motion and order the adoption if it finds that the
removal of the child is not in the best interest of the child.
1.4 Placement
(a) Once the child is relinquished for adoption or is declared free from
parental custody or control, the agency must, without delay, place the
child within the highest preference group where a family, which is
deemed qualified to adopt, is available.
(b) Before a placement with a family of a different racial background or
ethnic heritage is made, the agency shall develop documented evidence
of a diligent search for either a qualified relative of the child or a
qualified family with the same racial background or ethnic heritage as
the child, before the child has been relinquished for adoption. In
conducting a diligent search, each agency shall use all appropriate
resources, as necessary, in a directed effort to recruit a family that
meets the placement preference criteria through:
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(1) the use of all appropriate intra-agency, inter-agency, state,
regional, and national exchanges and listing books;
(2) child specific recruitment in electronic and printed media
coverage; and
(3) the use of agency contacts with parent, civic, and other groups to
advocate the adoption of specific waiting children.
1.5 Protection for Transracially Adopting Foster Parents
(a) If a child has resided in foster care with one family for a period of
four months, or less when deemed appropriate, has developed
substantial emotional ties to the foster parents, and the foster parents
petition to adopt the child, the agency shall consider the foster parents'
petition with respect to the child along with all other prospective
adoptive parents.
(b) The agency, in considering the foster parents' petition to adopt, shall
not use racial background or ethnic heritage as a factor in its
consideration comparing the foster parents' and other prospective
adoptive parents' petitions, but shall use all other appropriate factors
to assure a placement in the best interest of the child.
(c) The development of substantial emotional ties between a foster child
and petitioning foster parents may act as the deciding factor between
competing adoption petitions if all other factors indicate that the
competing petitions are equal.
1.6 Recruitment
(a) The Department and agencies shall develop and maintain a Minority
Family Recruitment Program that shall seek out qualified minority
prospective adoptive parents and, when feasible, maintain a pool of
such parents.
(b) The names and adoption preferences of prospective adoptive parents
shall be circulated among all appropriate intra-agency, inter-agency,
state, regional, and national exchanges and listing books.
(c) The agency shall utilize, as a resource in accomplishing such
recruitment, the resources and networks available through interested
groups and citizens, as well as the media in the communities to attract
prospective adoptive parents.
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1.7 Cause of Action
(a) Any individual aggrieved by any agency's improper use of racial
background or ethnic heritage as a factor in consideration of an
adoptive placement shall have the right to bring an action seeking
relief before the state court of appropriatejurisdiction. The court shall
have the authority to approve a temporary restraining order,
maintaining the existing placement of the child, until a court of proper
jurisdiction has reviewed the agency's use of racial background or
ethnic heritage.
(b) The court shall strictly scrutinize an agency's evaluation of racial
background and ethnic heritage of a child when an agency has placed
a child to ensure that the agency used these factors only as allowed in
section 1.2 in making a final determination of placement within the
preference group matrix established by this statute.
1.8 Commentary
(a) The Department shall compile and publish a commentary delineating
and explaining the statutory provisions herein, distribute the
commentary to all authorized agencies and courts, which shall review
agency placement decisions, and make the commentary available to
potential adoptive parents, as well as the general public.
(b) The commentary shall only be used for reference and is not a
controlling authority.
B. Explanation and Application of the Proposed Statute
Much controversy surrounds the implementation of race preference
statutes."' t However, nearly everyone agrees that when possible, a family
from a child's same racial background or ethnic heritage should adopt the
child. 15 2 Since this is the case, and since the best interest of the child is the
151. See supra notes 31-68 and accompanying text.
152. The following indicates the general consensus on this proposition. The NABSW position
is that African-American children must be placed with African-American families to ensure the
development of their racial and cultural identity, as well as social 'coping" skills. See supra note
38. As Dr. Morris Jeff, president of the NABSW, said in 1987, "[allthough there is evidence that
seems to indicate transracial adoption can work... Black children must be placed into a situation
that will allow their maximum development, and transracial adoption.. . doesn't even come close
to doing so." Walter Leavy, Should. Whites Adopi Black Children?, EBONY, Sept. 1987, at 78.
The Child Welfare League, which establishes adoption standards for agencies nationwide,
states: "Children in need of adoption have a right to be placed in a family that reflects their
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goal and the compelling state interest in all adoption proceedings," it follows
that a placement with a qualified family of the same race or ethnic heritage is
preferable if possible.'5 ' To that end, the statute uses as a starting point an
ethnicity or race." Child Welfare League of America, Standards For Adoption Service (1988),
reprinted in Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1190. The National Committee For Adoption, a national
clearinghouse for adoption information concerning not-for-profit adoption agencies, provides:
"Usually, placement of the child should be with a family of a similar racial or ethnic background."
FACTBOOK, supra note 63, at 124.
Rita Simon, along with Howard Alstein, who has been studying TRA since 1972 by inter-
viewing a group of TRA families and has found that many of the concerns about the dangers to
transracially adopted children's identities and feelings about race are unfounded, agrees that adoption
by a same-race family is preferable to TRA. Meer, supra note 20, at 17. Judith Ashton, a TRA
parent of two African-American children, feels that they have adapted well to being part of a white
family, but states:
[W]hile there is evidence that transracial adoption can work, this is not to say this
[placing Blacks into White homes] is what we should be doing. I absolutely believe that
children should be placed in similar ethnic or racial settings, and our first commitment
should be to find same-race families for the children who need homes.
Leavy, supra, at 82.
Rep. Karyne Conley, the sponsor of the law recently passed in Texas that prohibits the use
of race as a consideration in adoptions in Texas acknowledged that "children do better in their own
same race and ethnic situations," adding that her bill was designed to help the children who are not
being adopted by families of their own race. Clay Robison, Interracial Adoption Ban Is Targeted;
Reversal Measure Wins Tentative OK, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1993, at A22. Senator Howard M.
Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, co-author of the proposed "Multiethnic Placement Act of 1993," during his
opening statement in a Senate hearing on barriers to adoption on July 15, 1993, stated, "I believe
that same race placement is always desirable, if possible and if the prospective parents are
appropriate." 139 CoNo. IRc. S8712 (daily ed. July 14, 1993) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
The NAACP's statement on the issue was quoted in a recent article: "If there are Black
families available and suitable under the criteria of advancing the best interest of the child, Black
children should be placed with such Black families . . . . [However], if Black families are not
available for placement ... transracial adoption ought to be persued [sic] as a viable and preferred
alternative to keeping such children in foster homes." Thorwald Esbeusen, Chl/dren Need Homes,
Not Ethnic Politics, CRIsIs, Nov.IDec. 1992, at 24. Anne Hill, Director of Programs for the
National Urban League Inc. stated: "It's in the best interests of all children to be raised in families
of their same racial origin .... African-American children raised by white parents will never really
be a part of white culture, yet their own heritage and culture have been denied them. That causes
tremendous insecurity and confusion." Raymond & Turner, supra note 59, at 144.
153. See In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 786 (D.C. 1982) (finding that the advancement of a
child's best interest is the compelling government interest in adoption considerations). The best
interest standard is the traditional test applied in determining child placement. Twila L. Perry, Race
and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 54
(1990). See generally Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interest
Standard, 59 N.D. L. REv. 503 (1984).
154. I believe this is less preferable than a placement with a relative(s) in the child's biological
family, if such a family member is willing to adopt and is determined to be a qualified adoptive
parent. The biological family preference is itself supported by a strong common law preference to
strengthen and preserve the biological family. In re the Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375,379-80
(Minn. 1992).
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enunciated order of preference for placement'55 that the agency will use after
the agency has fully reviewed all petitions for adoption of the child."
The complaints most often leveled against such preference statutes are: (1)
that they cause minority children to remain waiting while agencies attempt to
find a qualified, same-race family and that the children are often cycled through
the foster care system and are denied the immediate permanency that children
need; 57 (2) that these statutes are used to further racial division;'- and (3)
that the foster parents' petition to adopt their foster child, usually a white foster
family of an African-American child, is thwarted by these statutes. The statutes,
when misapplied, cause race to become the overriding factor and operate to
destroy the developed bond between the child and the foster family.'"
155. The proposed statute follows the common order of preference used in states that establish
a preference in their statutes: (1) member(s) of child's biological family; (2) same-race family; (3)
family from a different race. See generally supra notes 128-36 (states with same-race preference).
The proposed statute does qualify the preference order by requiring that the family from a different
race demonstrate an understanding and sensitivity to the child's need for contact with his or her race
and development of the child's understanding about his or her racial, ethnic, and cultural
background, as well as suspending the same-race placement when foster parents of a different race
are attempting to adopt their foster child.
The proposed statute also utilizes a provision from the California statute, CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 8708(b) (West Supp. 1994), that allows placement of a child of mixed racial background or ethnic
heritage with the family that the child shares the most common traits and characteristics. This
provision is included to allow placement with a family which the child would appear to be the
biological child of the parents. It is important to duplicate the child's biological family so as to
facilitate the child's development of a sense of belonging in the family. DOROTHY W. SMITH &
LAURIE NEHILs SHERWEN, MOTHERS AND THEIR ADOPTED CHILDREN: THE BONDING PROCESS 101-
02 (2d ed. 1988).
156. This is to avoid the judicial shortcut taken by the court in In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375,
381 (Minn. 1992). The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's practice of reviewing only
the petition of the family with the highest statutory preference under the Minnesota statute. The
court stated that "[w]hen a presumption exists in favor of one petitioner over another, and there is
no reason to believe that the favored petitioner will not prevail, judicial time and litigants' resources
can be conserved by a single proceeding." Id.
157. See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1201; see also Rebecca L. Koch, Note, Transracial
Adoption in Light of the Foster Care Crisis: A Horse ofa Different Color, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 147, 153 (1992) (arguing that race-matching policies cause African-American children to wait
to be adopted while white families wait to adopt a child, regardless of color).
158. See generally Thomas Sowell, Adoption Apartheid, THE CHILDREN'S VOICE, Jan.-Mar.
1993, at 3, reprintedfrom WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1992, at A15 (comparing same-race matching
to apartheid and policies of the "Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, or other such groups").
159. See generally 60 Minutes: As Simple as Black and White (CBS Television Broadcast),
BURRELLE'S TRANSCRIPTS, vol. XXV, no. 6, Oct. 25, 1992, at 21. The program demonstrated that
race as a factor may have become determinative after the implementation of the Minnesota statute.
An example of its effect was pointed out, "[In the fall of 1992], under extreme pressure from
[adoption placement advocates]. . . Hennepin County reviewed all 120 cases where black children
had been placed in white foster homes [foster care also falls under the statute] .... The majority
were removed." Id. at 22; see also Raymond & Turner, supra note 59, at 140; lene Barth, Another
Platt: Adopting a Compromise in the Transracial Adoption Battle: A Propo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
502 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
To facilitate the placement of children, the statute ensures that once a
child's biological parents" free him or her for adoption,"m the agency cannot
delay the placement of the child. 6 The agency is required to place the child
within the highest statutory preference group where a family is available for
adoption."6 When a same-race family is not available, it is essential not to
prolong the wait for adoption, since immediate placement serves the best interest
of the child." Early placement and parenting, preferably within the first
weeks of life, is advantageous for the child.'" It allows for continuity of care
and reduces the number of traumatic changes that multiple placements
cause.'" Further, the effects on the- child of repeated separations are
minimized.'" It has been suggested that any preference for same-race
placement which causes delay in the placement of a child is unlawful racial
discrimination, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and
Child Torn From Those Who Love Her, NEWSDAY, Mar. 12, 1989, at 9.
160. A child is free to be adopted when the child's parent(s) relinquishes his or her parental
rights over the child. CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WiLLIAM L. PIERCE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ADOPTION 244 (1991).
161. If no family is immediately available, recruitment of a family shall continue in accordance
with the order of preference. This emphasis on not delaying placement will remove some of the
pressure that is currently on social workers in states or agencies with a same-race placement
requirement. Radin, supra note 17, at Ip.
162. This immediate placement will, of course, have to incorporate a standard "trial period"
before the petition for adoption is finalized to allow the placement agency to evaluate the placement
during further home-studies. This immediate placement provision will actually increase the number
of TRAs and placements in general. Further, it will successfully ensure the best interest of the child
by making it preferable to have a same-race placement, without working against the child's best
interest by causing the child to wait for placement. If a same-race placement is not available, the
need for immediate permanency should trump the same-race preference. See Brophy, supra note
1, at 72 (indicating that although matching the racial and ethnic backgrounds of children to their
adoptive families is preferable, the number of minority children available for adoption has soared
in recent years, which may require a diversion from the preference for same-race placements when
they are not available. To do otherwise will force many of these minority children into the already
overcrowded foster care system.).
163. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 7, 37, 44
(1978).
164. Id. at 37. Janet Eustis, Deputy Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services indicates that if a child is not placed quickly, the average wait for placement will be two
years, though this may be longer for minorities. She indicated that two years is too long due to the
developmental needs and vulnerability of children. Richard Jones, Director of the Boston Children's
Service Organization added: "'If we cannot find an African-American family in a reasonable period
of time.., it is appropriate to place that child in another caring, nurturing family. .. .'" Radin,
supra note 17, at lp (quoting Richard Jones). Rita Simon, Dean of the School of Justice at
American University and long-time researcher on the subject of TRA has said that although same-
race adoption is a better option than TRA; adoption, whether same-race or transracial, is almost
always preferable to long-term placement in foster care or group homes. Evans, supra note 56, at
b5.
165. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGE OF AMERICA, supra note 163, at 37.
166. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1994], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/8
1994] TRANSRA CIAL ADOPTION BATTLE 503
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Professor Bartholet is one of the best
known and well respected advocates for TRAs. Although she eventually
dismissed the notion as unworkable, she has acknowledged some benefits of
allowing what she terms a "truly mild preference" for same-race
placements. "~
Professor Bartholet notes that white parents may, though unwittingly,
harbor racial attitudes that could interfere with their ability to appreciate their
African-American child's racial identity."6  She further explains that such a
mild same-race preference may shield children from unnecessary pain and
stigma associated with being different, and at the same time, respect and serve
the concerns and the interests of the African-American community.'7
Professor Bartholet ultimately dismisses the use of such a preference.""' She
is concerned that agencies will misapply the preference, since adoption
professionals are extraordinarily committed to making same-race placements and
are allowed a high degree of discretion in their placement decisions. 172
The proposed model statute in this Note creates what can be called a mild
or limited same-race preference that will not allow its same-race preference to
create delays in placement, preferring instead immediate placement with any
available and qualified family. Further, it deals with the possibility of misuse,
whether intended or unintended, of the statutory preference. The statute
enunciates the specific weight that race may play, and requires the courts to
strictly scrutinize the agency's consideration of race when it places a child.' "
Finally, the statute creates a cause of action that petitioning parents can bring
when the agency acts in contravention of the statute with respect to the use of
racial background or ethnic heritage in adoption proceedings. The proposed
statute requires documentation of the search for families in the various
preference groups to supply the court with evidence as to whether the agency
followed the mandate of the statute.174
The establishment of a required Cultural Sensitivity Course will help TRA
167. FAMILY BONDS, supra note 15, at 112.
168. Id. at 112-15.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 114.
171. Id. at 115.
172. Id.
173. See In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 784-85 (D.C. 1982) (stating that enabling the court to
use a strict scrutiny analysis is necessary because any statute containing racial classifications is
constitutionally suspect) (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
174. The proposed statute uses CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(c) (West Supp. 1994) as a model for
this provision.
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parents better prepare for the issues that will confront them and their
children."7 5 These classes will allow parents who are going through the same
type of adoption at the same time to interact and to develop networks to assist
each other in the future. Agencies should encourage parents who have
previously gone through the classes to assist in the discussions in future classes.
This would give new adoptive parents the ability to network with parents who
have already dealt with many of the issues that they will have to confront in the
future.
Such classes and a good faith effort will not change the lack of common
racial background and ethnic heritage between the child and the parents.
However, sensitizing parents to the needs, questions, and problems the child will
face as he or she grows older can go a long way toward compensating for the
differences. 7 " The completion of these classes can help demonstrate the
commitment of potential parents to adopt transracially and to foster racial and
ethnic growth and understanding in their child. Moreover, the sensitivity
courses may allow parents to realize that they are not ready to adopt
transracially, thereby reducing the number of failed placements.'"
To increase the odds that the child will have a chance at adoption by a
family of the same-race, the state should make a commitment, which is
expressed within the model statute, to develop a minority family recruiting and
adoption education project."7  Although such a project will obviously require
a financial commitment, if a same-race placement is indeed the option that is in
175. See Nazario, supra note 13. Nazario discusses the problems that five transracially adopted
children and their adoptive parents faced as the children grew up. One of the TRA adoptees, now
a college student stated, "'I don't feel I'm me around black people-they aren't like us [referring
to his white roommates]. I resigned myself to not being black. I'm not going to act something I
don't want to be. Who is to say I have to be black? It's so trivial.'" Id. at 1. Many TRA children
will face these confusing situations. A parent may be able to better understand these situations, or
be able to foster better feelings in the child about their own race, if they are able to discuss these
issues early in the adoption. Id. See DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (holding that the consideration of transracial adoptive parents' sensitivity and attitude about
the racial issues and problems they will face is constitutionally permissible in determining the best
interest of the child).
176. It has been shown that an adoptive family that is inadequately prepared for the child's
behavior and needs has a higher level of stress surrounding the adoption, as well as more incidents
of disruption of the adoption. More successful placements are found when there is group preparation
that promotes networks among families who are or have experienced the same kind of placement.
This network will often be available to assist and advise the parents long after the relationship with
the social worker has terminated. RiCHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERY, ADOPTION AND
DISRUPInoN-RA'rEs, RIsKS, AND RESPONSES 169 (1988).
177. Id.
178. This will answer the NABSW's complaint that agencies are not trying hard enough to find
qualified same-race families, thereby causing an apparent necessity for TRAs. Donna Britt,
Tramraclal Adopion-A Special Way of Showing Love, MIAI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1993, at 3M.
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the children's best interest, the states must make this commitment."7  Pilot
and privately run recruitment projects have shown that recruitment is an
effective way to locate qualified adoptive parents.t" If a state project can
replicate the successes of the above mentioned projects, it will help alleviate the
number of minority children waiting for placement. The ultimate goal,
enunciated in the model statute, is to eventually develop a pool of qualified
minority families to adopt same-race adoptable children. Agencies have been
accused in the past of rejecting minority families at a much higher rate than
white families. '' The basis for some of these decisions appears
questionable. " This problem is addressed within the proposed statute.
Families that are rejected because of an agency's improper use of racial
background or ethnic heritage as a factor in consideration of an adoptive
179. Such a program could eventually save the state money because it would help reduce the
number of children who are waiting for placement in the foster care system, largely minority, who
tend to languish within the system on average for a longer period of time than do white children.
Noting that early experiences of multiple foster-home placements can severely effect a child's
development of a sense of bonding and trust, Morris Jeff, President of the NABSW, states that "if
this were a crisis in the white community [white children not being placedi, all resources would be
mobilized to make sure those children were placed. They wouldn't take the easy out of sending
them to the black community." Radin, supra note 17, at lp.
180. See generally Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1196-97. The One Church/One Child program
was started in Chicago by Father George Clements and encourages each African-American church
to recruit from its membership at least one family to adopt a child. The program has placed
hundreds of children and is now active in 17 states. Id. See also Leavy, supra note 152, at 82.
Homes For Black Children, a private Detroit agency, is able to place African-American children in
African-American homes at such a higher and quicker rate than government agencies, that one writer
questioned how hard the public agencies were trying. Id. See also William Raspberry, Hurdles
Slow Adoption of Black Children, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1990, at 36. See generally NABSW
Update, supra note 41, at 5-6; Gilles & Kroll, supra note 50; supra notes 50-55 and accompanying
text.
181. A sampling of African-American families showed that between forty and fifty percent
would consider adoption. One study indicated that of 800 African-American families that applied
for adoption, only two were approved (representing a .0025 acceptance rate), as compared to the
national average of one of ten families being approved. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 1, at 9.
182. See Page, supra note 14, at B13. In a recent case, a California advertisement requested
African-American family applications for adoption. Of the 2000 responses to this advertisement by
African-American families, only 15 made it through the application process. The reasons given by
the social workers often were highly questionable: "'No pictures on the wall ...Home lacked
stimulation.. . Woman got up too early to go to work... Family wasn't black enough... Man
defended his wife too much." Id. See also Mary A. Jackson, In Search of Home, Program Helps
Get Black Boys Adopted, CHI. SUN-TIMES, April 17, 1994, at 20 (discussing the rejection of an
African-American school teacher's attempt to adopt a child; the caseworker noted in her report that
the applicant's weight indicated an emotional problem and that the plastic covers on the applicants
living-room furniture indicated that she was too rigid).
Critics complain that social workers are searching for the Huxtables from The Cosby Show
when the realities of most families of any color tend to be less glamorous. Page, supra note 14, at
B13. When all of the restrictive requirements are tempered, the fact, contrary to the myth, is that
African-Americans adopt at a rate four and a half times the rate of whites. Id.
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placement will have a cause of action against the agency for equitable relief. 3
This provision will place agencies on notice that they must fairly consider racial
background and ethnic heritage in the evaluation of competing adoption petitions
and must document their consideration appropriately.
Subsidy assistance programs that assist families who adopt hard-to-place
children are ancillary provisions that are in place in most states and should be
further utilized to help increase the pool of prospective adoptive parents."
There has been some abuse of this type of program." However, subsidies
can help potential families, often minority families, who would be deemed
suitable adoptive families, based upon every other factor, if their financial
position was slightly stronger."' Due to their wide use and broad focus, a
subsidy provision does not need to be incorporated into this proposed statute;
however, states can assist their recruitment process by increasing these subsidies
183. The relief available will be a temporary restraining order, maintaining the current
placement of the child, and the right to an appeal of the decision made by the agency that will be
examined under strict scrutiny.
184. See generally Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1198-99. Although the states differ in the amount
of subsidy, the language of the statutes is very similar. Indiana's provision, for example, states in
pertinent part:
31-3-3-1 Aid for Adoption of Children-Definition of "Hard to Place"
(a) Aid under this chapter shall be known as Aid for Adoption of Children.
(b) For the purpose of this chapter, a "hard to place" child is a child who is
disadvantaged because of ethnic background, race, color, language,
physical, mental, or medical handicaps, age or because he or she is a
member of a sibling group which should be placed in the same home.
31-3-3-2 Payment and extent
(a) When a petition for adoption has been filed seeking aid and the aid is
ordered by the court, the county department of welfare. . . may be ordered
to pay either or both of the following subsidies to the adoptive parents . . .
(1) For the support of the child or children, not to exceed seventy-
five percent (75 %) of the monthly cost of care of the child ....
(2) For the medical [costs] . . . of the child which existed before
the adoption.
(b) The subsidies shall continue until the child reaches eighteen (18) years of
age, becomes emancipated, or dies. or until further order of court,
whichever occurs first . . . . As a condition for continuation of the
subsidies, the court shall require the adopting parents to file a sworn report
.... at least once each year as to the location, financial condition of the
parents, and condition of the child . . . . On the basis of the report or
information . . . . the subsidy may be continued, increased, reduced, or
discontinued by the court.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-3-1 & 31-3-3-2 (Burns 1987).
185. See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 1198-99.
186. Id. at 1198. The federal government encourages these subsidy programs by matching state
funds. The author notes that this program began with the passage of the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 670-79a (1988)). Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1994], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/8
1994] TRANSRA CIAL ADOPTION BATTLE 507
and making their availability known to prospective adoptive parents during
recruitment.
As for the charge that same-race preferences further racial divisiveness, one
must remember that the best interest of the child is the paramount issue.
I87
It is often easier for a child to merge into a family that looks like the child and
with whom the child shares a common heritage. " Further, parents of the
same racial background or ethnic heritage are better equipped to teach a child
the requisite social coping skills to understand and deal with society from the
perspective of that racial or ethnic group. To accomplish these goals, the use
of racial classifications is simply to further the interest of the child and not a
"racist" or "divisive" agenda.'s
Well-meaning people, attempting to encourage TRAs, are often seeking to
help break down racial lines. Perhaps they hope to create more families that are
symbols that attest to the proposition that different races can live together in
harmony. Unfortunately, their efforts may not only work against the best
interest of these children, but may use these children to fight the social ill of
racism, that the children had no role in creating.'90
To insure that a same-race preference does not thwart a foster family's
attempt to adopt their foster child with whom they have bonded, the statute
includes a provision that expressly allows for the consideration of these foster
187. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
188. SMITH & SHERWEN, supra note 155, at 101-02. The authors note that although common-
heritage placements are easier for the child, the issue of race is transcended in many cases in favor
of the fundamental need for a family. Id. See also Nazario, supra note 13. An interview with a
transracially adopted child demonstrates the pain that can be caused by looking different from his
or her adoptive parents. Sarah, an African-American adopted transracially, said she felt like a black
person stuck with a white person's ways. She felt alienated by her African-American classmates in
school. She indicated that she became obsessed, believing something was wrong with her. "'I felt
like a big bright spotlight was on me all the time because I had white parents.'" Id. She only later
found comfort by rebelling against her parents and moving in with her African-American boyfriend.
She stated that she disliked seeing white parents with an African-American child. -'I know they
love the child to death . . . But when I think of the kid I say: What a terrible thing.'" Id.
Although this is an extreme example of problems that a TRA can cause, it demonstrates that
emotional harm to children adopted transracially can be a reality.
189. See generally Evans, supra note 56, at b5 (dealing with many of the coping problems
faced by tranaracially adopted children as they try to understand, explain, and live with the fact that
they are from a different culture than their family).
190. This is not to say that we should not encourage TRA when a placement cannot be made
with a qualified family member of the child or a same-race family, only that we should not bypass
those placements that seem to be in the best interest of the child if they are available.
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parents' application for adoption."" Furthermore, the proposed statute
removes the same-race preference order in these foster family situations."9
Permanency should be valued above same-race placement, especially in a
situation where the child has bonded and the family is a qualified adoptive
family. 193
Agencies should not use race to tear a child away from a happy and loving
environment once those bonds are developed.' The ultimate adoption by a
family other than a child's foster family is one factor shown to cafise adoption
disruption and dissolution 95 The model statute's provision removes the same-
race preference when a foster family is attempting to adopt their foster child
transracially, recogtfizing the need for stability. The model statute further
allows such bonding to act as a decisive factor among equivalent competing
petitioning families. One of the most serious psychological and developmental
hazards that children face within the child welfare system is the problem of
191. This provision uses aspects of the California provision. See supra notes 137-39 and
accompanying text. See generally Anna Quindlen, Love Has to Count in Complex Formula Thai
Decides Adoption, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1994, at N21; Bill Mandel, Foster Parents Persevere in
Interracial Adoption, Hous. CHRON., May 1, 1994, at A7 (addressing the emotional and legal
battles of white foster parents faced with the possibility of losing their African-American foster
children after they decided to adopt the child largely, if not wholly, on the basis of race).
192. This part of the provision is framed after the Florida provision. See supra notes 140-41.
193. It may be contended that agencies, to avoid the possibility of white foster parents
attempting to adopt an African-American or other minority foster child, will not place these children
in white foster homes from the start. However, this would not be a realistic option because, at the
present time, there obviously are not enough African-American and minority foster families to avoid
placement in white homes. Furthermore, the number of foster families that eventually apply for the
adoption of their foster child who is of a different race is quite low compared to the number of white
foster families in the country. Finally, if agencies do not want to place minority children in foster
homes, they may attempt to recruit minority foster parents. lene Barth, Another Child Tornfrom
Those Who Love Her, NEWSDAY, Mar. 12, 1989, at 9.
194. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. 1955). Although the adoptive parent
was the African-American husband of the white child's natural mother, the principle of maintaining
a developed and loving atmosphere is the same. Courts have recognized that psychological bonding
is an important interest to protect. See also McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 331-32
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that an African-American child should be returned to its white foster
family of two years, instead of being removed to be placed with another foster family that was
African-American, because to do otherwise would cause irreparable harm to the child). Peter
Forsythe, Director of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, argues that the separation-attachment
literature and the TRA literature both clearly show that it is a dangerous practice to move children
from foster families where they are emotionally established. Barth, supra note 159, at 9.
195. The term "adoption disruption" is used to describe the termination of an adoptive
placement when the would-be adoptive parents return the child to the agency. "Dissolution" is used
to indicate the termination of a finalized adoption. The detriment of removal from a foster family
with which a child has bonded is further illustrated by a finding that a child who has had multiple
placements is more likely to have his or her placement disrupted or dissolved. FACrBOOK, supra
note 63, at 196.
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attachment and separation.'" To avoid the risk of severe and possibly
permanent emotional damage and to ensure the child's developmental needs are
met, agencies should not move a child from a known successful placement to an
unknown one, even one that is potentially better."7
Some people fear that the agencies will, upon learning of the foster parents'
petition to adopt a child of a different race, use some other pretense for
removing the child from the foster parents' home. As seen in In re R.M.G.,
and required in the model statute, the agency must document and prove the other
causes.' " If the agency's removal is based solely or largely on the different
race of the foster parents, the agency is using race as a factor beyond its
constitutional limits.'"
Misunderstanding and institutional racism may cause misapplication of this
proposed statute. Thus, the statute contains certain safeguards to insure proper
and constitutional application. First, the statute mandates that, as in In re
R.M. G., a strict scrutiny standard applies." This will put agencies on further
notice that the court will evaluate their decisions to deny TRAs to a far greater
extent than in the past. It will also notify trial judges that they risk a higher
court's reversal if they pay total deference to the agencies' decisions without
examining the record and analyzing the weight the agency has given to race in
making the placement decision. 201
Finally, the proposed statute also requires the creation of a statutory
commentary. The commentary is to be distributed to state adoption agencies,
to courts that deal with adoption, and to the public. The purpose is to explain
in a detailed but simplified manner, the way in which the statute is to operate.
The commentary will allow judges who do not deal with adoption on a regular
basis to have a practical reference as to the role that race should play in the
adoption equation. Most importantly, the commentary will further educate the
public generally, and potential adoptive parents specifically, about the adoption
196. PAUL D. STEINHUER, THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE: A SYSTEMATIC GUIDE
TO CASE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING FOR CHILDREN IN CARE 13 (1991).
197. Id. at 30-31. Research indicates that when a child has early experiences that prevent the
opportunity to form a secure attachment-relationship with one or a very few caregivers, this
experience leads to seriously impaired development. LAURA E. BERK, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 420
(2d ed. 1991).
198. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 794 (D.C. 1982).
199. See generally supra notes 69-127 and accompanying text.
200. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 784-94.
201. This analysis follows the analysis from R.M.G., see supra note 120-123 and accompanying
text.
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process and the role of race as a factor.'
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of the battle over the practice of TRA, the proponents
and opponents of TRA have been entrenched in their positions, and the result
is that few TRAs are made today. Further, as a result of this battle, those
written and unwritten laws and policies that deal with TRA lend little or no
guidance to the agencies in such considerations. The result is a record number
of minority children stuck in the foster care system of our country. The
problem has been compounded because adoption agencies, in their desire to
make same-race placements, have overlooked the availability of making
transracial placements.
The lack of statutory guidance has allowed the agencies to continue to
overlook transracial placements, and arguably allowed agencies to often use race
as the sole determinative factor in contravention of the United States
Constitution. The time has come for a statute to deal with the issue, specifically
enunciating the role race may play and the ways in which we can reduce the
number of children waiting for a permanent home and a family to care for them.
The model statute attempts to compromise the positions of the parties
entrenched on both sides of the TRA issue. This compromise requires that the
adoption agencies operate in the best interest of the children they serve. The
statute is specific about the role that race may play in placement considerations.
The statute recognizes that same-race placements are the best possible
placement, yet refuses to raise race to the point where it causes a child to wait
for placement. The history over the last twenty-two years shows that neither
side in this battle can claim complete victory and probably will never be able to
do so. Therefore, such a compromise must be adopted to serve the best interest
of the minority children who await adoption. If a compromise is not reached,
these children's futures will be the casualties of the continued battle.
Allen C. Platt III
202. See GILLE & KROL, supra note 50; see also supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text
(indicating that educating potential adoptive parents about the process increases adoptions).
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